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ABSTRACT
This thesis argues that Japan will soon overcome most
of the technological barriers that have prevented it from
becoming a world-class competitor in aerospace, although
significant economic and political constraints will remain.
This capability--largely the result of a series of joint
ventures with US firms--will position Japan to compete in
high-value-added component markets and to participate in
future joint ventures with the world's aerospace powers on
an equal-equity basis.
Chapter one establishes the analytical framework of
this thesis by outlining the three phases in the development
of Japanese aerospace strategy. The historical background
is also explored.
Chapter two uses the analytical framework and defines
the key players in Japan's aerospace industry. It also
explores Japan's acquisition of US aerospace technology as a
critical element of the Phase I strategy, starting in the
early 1950s. Technology linkages--both with the US and with
related indigenous players in electronics and advanced
materials--are analyzed. Other characteristics of Phase II
in Japan's strategic development, including increasing
specialization among major players, are defined.
Chapter three describes in detail the critical programs
that comprise Japan's Phase III strategy, the influence of
government support and regulation, and key macroeconomic
considerations that constrain Japan's aerospace expansion. A
modified Porter analysis is presented, along with the
author's projections for likely strategies and counter
strategies that may emerge as the global industry responds
to the Japanese challenge.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Richard J. Samuels
Title: Associate Professor, Political Science and
Director, MIT - Japan Science and Technology Program
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4CHAPTER ONE: ARGUMENT AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Chapter one establishes the analytical framework of
this thesis by outlining the three phases in the development
of Japanese aerospace strategy. The historical background
is also explored.
Argument
The Japanese aerospace industry is on the threshold of
a new era. Building on a base of technology it has acquired
largely through a series of joint ventures with US firms
since 1952, the industry as a whole will soon overcome most
of the technological barriers that have kept it from
becoming a world-class competitor.
Economic obstacles, especially those relating to a
large-scale entry into the commercial market, remain
formidable. Indeed, unless a major realignment occurs
within that market, Japanese hopes of becoming a major,
prime contractor in the foreseeable future are largely
unfounded. However, this does not preclude their
significant expansion in the commercial subcontractor role
and component markets.
Political constraints--including the prohibition
against the export of military goods--currently impede
Japan's military aerospace efforts. Ironically, it is the
._._I , 
military market that presents Japan's most logical entry
point for aerospace expansion.
The combined strategy of Japan's aerospace industry,
uninhibited by anti-trust regulation and with the full
support of MITI, is best described as "maintaining options".
While continuing to rely on US expertise in its efforts to
obtain specific technologies and marketing acumen, the
industry is completing its indigenous acquisition of a solid
research base, requisite capital infrastructure (at least
for military market expansion), and adequate design
experience. The Japanese want, at the very least, to be
able to participate in future joint ventures on an equal-
equity basis with the world's major aerospace powers.
This situation poses an unprecedented challenge to the
US aerospace industry. US firms must decide if they should
cooperate with Japan, possibly creating a future competitor,
or ignore Japan and lose any hope of control over the
emergence of an aerospace power.
__
6An Historical Perspective of Japan's Aerospace Industry
Prior to the outbreak of World War II, Japan's aircraft
industry ranked among the world's greatest, although it was
almost entirely concentrated on the production of military
planes. At its zenith, the industry produced some 25,000
aircraft and 40,000 engines annually.1 The industry was led
by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, which had absorbed
Mitsubishi Aircraft Company in 1934.
At the war's end in 1945, Japan's aircraft industry was
completely dismantled. Aircraft production was banned, key
production facilities were confiscated as reparations, and
all remaining facilities were destroyed.2 For seven
critical years as the victorious aerospace powers soared
into the jet age, Japan's industry remained idle.
In 1952, as the Korean War raged and Japan's industrial
output returned to pre-war levels, Japan's aircraft industry
was permitted to resume operations. With virtually no
capital infrastructure or indigenous market demand, the
reborn industry began repair and maintenance work on
aircraft assigned to the US armed forces in Japan. This
marked the beginning of Japan's cooperation with US aircraft
manufacturers.
1 Yasuichi Arao (ed.), Aerospace Industry in Japan 1987-
1988, (Tokyo: SJAC, 1988), p.3 .
2 Ibid., p. 3.
--- II a ·s
7This new beginning, Phase I of Japanese postwar
aerospace strategy, is characterized by a broad-based
attempt to acquire any Western aerospace technology that
could be used as a foundation upon which an indigenous
industry could be rebuilt. Further, the technology during
this phase is almost entirely limited to the manufacturing
and repair segments of the value-added chain. Japanese
aerospace firms attempted to coordinate their strategy
through the newly formed Aircraft Industry Council
(established July 28, 1952) and the Jet Engine Research
Group (established October 1, 1952). Coordination was also
a by-product of US firms and the US military awarding
contracts to different Japanese firms. This take-what-you-
can-get strategy most closely resembles Quinn's "logical
incrementalism"3-- a step-by-step approach to strategic
development (see Chart One).
Phase II of Japanese aerospace strategic development
began in 1959 with the all-Japanese YS-11 commercial
transport program. This marked post-war Japan's first
attempt to build upon its technology acquisition and pre-war
expertise in a complete, coordinated manner. The Japanese
government lent strong financial support, Japanese industry
formed the Nihon Aeroplane Manufacturing Company consortium
to manage the effort, and member firms shared responsibility
3 James Brian Quinn, "Strategic Change: 'Logical
Incrementalism'," Sloan Management Review, Fall 1978, p. 7.
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8for the entire value- added chain--not simply manufacturing
and repair as in Phase I. Phase II is also marked by
increasing specialization among the major players, allowing
a minimization of redundancy to increase the efficiency of
the small industry.
Other indigenous programs were pursued during Phase II
including the T-1 and T-2 jet trainers and the C-1
transport. These were relatively unsophisticated designs by
comparison with the advanced jet fighters produced in the
United States and Western Europe. Still, these programs
provided valuable design experience that--in combination
with US technology and rising indigenous capabilities in
electronics--would provide the foundation for Japan's
aspirations. (These programs are all discussed in greater
detail in the following chapters.)
Over the next three decades, Japan's aerospace industry
proceeded gradually in an attempt to overcome a sharp lag in
technology caused by the seven year absence from the market.
Japan participated in a number of US military aircraft
programs through purchases made by the Japanese Defense
Agency (JDA).
-- ------- I- -- __1____ 1_1
CHART ONE
DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGY IN THE JAPANESE AEROSPACE INDUSTRY
Phase I
1952-1959
Phase II
1959-1988
"Logical Incrementalism"
Concentrate on repair/manufacturing end
of value-added chain
Attempt to coordinate players through
industry councils
Take-what-you-can-get
Strong technical dependence on US
Steady progression of foreign technology
acquisition
Apply learned technology to indigenous
product
Consortium forming
Begin to approach whole value-added chain
Increase specialization among major players
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Japan's Aerospace Industry Today
The decade of the 1980s witnessed Japan's first real
surge in aerospace. Aircraft production value jumped from
less than Y300 billion in 1981 to more than Y640 billion
($2.68 billion @ Y239=$1) in 1985, according to the Society
of Japanese Aerospace Companies (SJAC).4 This surge was
driven by the demand of the JDA: JDA's aircraft
expenditures, as published in the Defense White Paper, rose
from Y174 billion in 1981 to Y338 billion in 1985.5
In addition to rising numbers of aircraft rolling off
the line, the Japanese aerospace industry broadened its
product line to include all the major product types sold by
the major worldwide aerospace producers: airplanes,
helicopters, missiles, remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs),
space launch vehicles, and a countless array of components
and subsystems.
Despite this surge in production, employment in the
aircraft industry has remained relatively flat for the past
two decades. With some 26,000 employees in the entire
country working in the aircraft industry, Japan's industry
is roughly the size of Grumman Aerospace, America's smallest
major jet fighter manufacturer. This lack of "critical
mass" has led some critics to charge that Japan does not
4 Op. Cit., Arao, p. 7.
5 Ibid., p. 32.
_1-11_-_11 -__.------·
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have a sufficient infrastructure to compete with world-class
manufacturers.6
The primary employers of this select group, Japan's
"big four" in aerospace, include Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
(MHI), Fuji Heavy Industries (FHI), Kawasaki Heavy
Industries (KHI), and Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries
(IHI). The first three--MHI, FHI, and KHI--have
concentrated their efforts in the development of airframes,
while IHI has concentrated in the development and production
of jet engines. Another player within the Mitsubishi group
--Mitsubishi Electric or MELCO--has emerged as the leader in
avionics, the onboard electronics systems.
6 A number of sources refer to this lack of "critical mass."
Most recent sources include an interview with senior
managers at Boeing Commercial Airplanes, held in Seattle on
January 18, 1989.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE MAJOR PLAYERS
Chapter two uses the analytical framework and defines
the key players in Japan's aerospace industry. It also
explores Japan's acquisition of US aerospace technology as a
critical element of the Phase I strategy, starting in the
early 1950s. Technology linkages--both with the US and with
related indigenous players in electronics and advanced
materials--are analyzed. Other characteristics of Phase II
in Japan's strategic development, including increasing
specialization among major players, are defined.
Japan's Big Four Led by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
Executives and engineers at Mitsubishi's Nagoya
Aircraft Works, interviewed recently on the condition
of anonymity, expect to become world-class contenders
in military aviation.
-- Mainichi Shimbun, 17 October 1988
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) is a descendant of
the Nagasaki Forge of the Tokugawa Shogunate. For the past
fourteen years, MHI has been the top contractor for the
Japanese Defense Agency (JDA), according to the Yamaichi
Research Institute of Securities and Economics.7 In fiscal
1986, its share of the JDA market was 24.3% or Y291 billion
($1.73 billion @ Y168.5=$1). According to MHI annual
reports, total net sales in 1986 were Y3.53 trillion ($20.9
billion). Aircraft and special vehicles contributed 8.9% to
a sales base dominated by automobiles (44.8%) (see Chart
Two). MHI's affiliated trading company, Mitsubishi
Corporation, had trading transactions in 1986 totaling Y17.1
7 Yamaichi Research Institute of Securities and Economics,
Inc., Investment Brief: Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, (Tokyo,
April 1987), p. 2.
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CHART TWO
COMPARISON OF THE BIG FOUR
JDA Market
Y291b
¥170b
Y- 22b
¥e 93b
Total
Net Sales
3530b
¥ 700b
Y 768b
¥ 800b
Aircraft
Related Sales
9%
17%
6%
12%
Source: 1986 data from annual reports and SJAC.
MHI
KHI
FHI
IHI
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trillion ($101 billion), which translates to a 20.6%
contribution from MHI for the year.8
MHI operates relatively independent of Mitsubishi
Corporation. In fact, according to Prudential Bache
Securities, "decentralization of decision-making has been an
important factor in the past success of the company's
diversification and restructuring...We expect the company to
continue to diversify aggressively into new fields and to
expand overseas operations."9 Yamaichi gives MHI its
highest investment rating, "A, very attractive".1 0
Dealing from such a strong financial base, MHI has
found it easy to dominate Japan's aerospace industry. In
1986, MHI won two of JDA's largest contract awards--the
Raytheon Patriot surface-to-air missile program ($668
million) and the McDonnell Douglas F-15J program ($524
million)--according to Aviation Week.11 Further, MHI has
emerged as the most frequent industry contact point in joint
ventures with the US, and is frequently the leader in
8 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Annual Report 1986, p.1. Also,
Mitsubishi Corporation, Annual Report 1987, p. 1.
9 H. Sawa, et al, Restructuring Japan's Industrial Giants --
Industry Report, (Tokyo: Prudential Bache Securities, 28
June 1988).
10 Op. Cit., Yamaichi, p. 1.
11 "Mitsubishi Leads Top Japanese Defense Contractors,"
Aviation Week and Space Technology, 27 April 1987, p. 141.
---- --". lr L*a~---`ar--.· l*L·-
Japan's aerospace. industrial consortia, dating back to the
YS-11 program.
MHI's contracts with the aerospace industries in the
United States have included:
o The US S-55 helicopter program (1954), that included
a technical assistance agreement for parts manufacture
and repair with Sikorsky. MHI learned the basics
of then-current helicopter manufacturing technology.
Sikorsky later concluded many follow-on agreements with
MHI.
o The US F-86F fighter program (1955), that provided
MHI the essential techniques for the construction of
jet aircraft. MHI manufactured some 77% of the
aircraft's parts, the remaining "key" parts being
supplied directly by North American.
o The US F-104J (1962) and F-4EJ (1971) programs, from
which Japan learned basic knowledge of aluminum
aircraft structures capable of withstanding the stress
of high-g maneuvering and supersonic flight. MHI was
responsible for the manufacture of nearly all airframe
component parts.
------- 
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CHART THREE
MHI JOINT DVELOPMENT A AND IGENOUS PROGRAMS
Level of Technological
Sophistication
Total Manufacture
and Development of
Advanced Design
Supersonic
High-G Airframe
Manufacture
Whole Subsonic
Airframe
Subassembly
Less "Key" Parts
Small Parts
Manufacture
and Repair
CCV
F-15
F104 F-1 T-2 F-4
MU-2
YS-11
IF
S-5
1954
-86F
1964 1974 1984
Year
KEY: Cooperative programs with US = Bold
Independent, indigenous program = Standard
Source: Analysis of data contained in Jane's All the
World's Aircraft, years 1957 through 1989.
111-------
o The US F-15 program (1981), from which Japan gained
state-of-the-art knowledge in aircraft fabrication
and assembly. Those components that the US refused
to give Japan, mainly electronic warfare "black boxes,"
were replaced by indigenous MELCO components. The
first F-15s Japan built were assembled from "knocked-
down" kits; all of the later F-15s were built entirely
in Japan.
These programs exhibit a key element of the Phase II
strategy: a steady progression of technology acquisition
starting from small parts manufacture and developing, over
the course of three decades, to supersonic airframe design
and manufacture. As Chart Three indicates, MHI was quick to
apply these technologies in indigenous programs including:
o The YS-11 short-range transport (1959), the first
true attempt by Japan to integrate the basic
manufacturing technologies assimilated from the United
States. The YS-11 was actually built by NAMC (Nihon
Aeroplane Manufacturing Company), a consortium led by
MHI and subsidized by the Japanese government.
o The MU-2 STOL utility transport (1965), which
extended the basic aluminum airframe lessons of the
YS-11 by adding the complexity of STOL (Short Takeoff
and Landing) technology primarily in wing design. The
I _1_5n_ 1___1_ ·UI j·L__R*________I____I(UIIIVII
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use of STOL was probably an attempt to test a possible
niche market entry for a small load (9 passenger),
special purpose (short, unprepared runway) aircraft.
o The T-2 (1967) jet trainer, a logical first step in
the development of indigenous, high performance jet
aircraft. Japan gained critical design and systems
integration experience firsthand.
o The F-1 fighter (1967), a strong manufacturing
effort hindered by Japan's inexperience in high-
performance aircraft design and systems integration.
The F-1 was a very well-built, poorly designed fighter
that lacked the performance necessary to compete
with its primary (Soviet) threat.
o The T-2 CCV (1985), Japan's most important lesson in
the development of advanced avionics systems. Although
clearly behind the technology of the somewhat
comparable US F-15 STOL or US X-29, the CCV, or control
configured vehicle, was considered by Japan's aerospace
industry to be its qualifying entrant in the world-
class fighter arena.
_II___I____ICIC______
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Building on Indigenous Technological Strengths
Supplementing the absorption of foreign technology,
Japan's aerospace industry, led by MHI, has aggressively
pursued the development of advanced technologies by
leveraging against indigenous technological strengths.
Indeed, MHI's ability to develop airframe parts made of
advanced, lightweight composite materials is due in part to
Japan's indigenous strength in the production of carbon
fibers. Japan's Toray industries--a member of the Mitsui
group--is widely recognized as a world leader in the
production of composite materials. Toray was able to assist
MHI in the development of an all-composite wing, effectively
pushing MHI up the technology development curve--using
Foster's terminology, the S-curve--and significantly
reducing development risk, time, and cost.1 2 Further as
Samuels and Whipple point out, the transfer may be
especially efficient:
Organizationally, since much of the new technology
originates in other industries, Japanese
aerospace's tighter intersectoral links should assist
its identification and transfer. Managerially,
Japanese firms have thirty years of experience with
interfirm cooperation, while it is a brave new
world for their American counterparts. 1 3
12 Richard Foster. Innovation: The Attacker's Advantage
(New York: Summit Books, 1986), p. 31.
13 Richard Samuels and Benjamin Whipple, "Defense Production
and Industrial Development: The Case of Japanese Aircraft,"
(Cambridge: MIT-Japan Science and Technology Program, 1988),
p. 14.
--- ----~--~"-~--~r `~I~~---- -- --- --___- --l_1__l
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As MHI continues to dominate Japanese airframe
manufacture--including composite parts--Mitsubishi Electric
Corporation (MELCO) continues to dominate the onboard
electronic components or avionics. MELCO also provides a
clear example of Japan's ability to leapfrog existing
technology, (jumping to the next technology development
curve) and proceed directly to the next generation. Indeed,
with virtually no experience in the design of airborne radar
systems, MELCO recently flight-tested an "active array"
radar that builds upon Japan's indigenous strengths in
advanced (gallium arsenide) electronics technology. This
radar is similar to next-generation designs in the United
States.
Capital Investment
In an effort to enhance its indigenous design and
production capabilities, MHI has led the way for Japanese
capital infrastructure investment including:
o New Design Center at its Oye plant in Nagoya,
including a combat simulator and an improved supersonic
wind tunnel, according to Aerospace Japan Weekly.1 4
Wing Newsletter reported that the 1,800 square meter
facility cost some Y4 billion.1 5
14. "MHI to Set-Up FS-X Design Center, "Aerospace Japan -
Weekly, 6 June 1988, p. 5.
15 "MHI to Construct FS-X Design Center in Nagoya," Wing
Newsletter, 1 June 1988.
__  _11_1__
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o New Anechoic Chamber at its Komaki South plant in
Nagoya, large enough to accommodate an entire fighter
aircraft--Japan's fifth largest.1 6
o Numerically Controlled Machines including three-
spindle, five-axis profilers, automated welders, and
presses, according to Aviation Week.17
o Large-scale expansion in 1987 with floor space
additions totaling 15.3 acres, according to Aviation
Week.18
o New Stealth Facility, according to Wing
Newsletter.19
Clearly with such significant investment in development
and production facilities, MHI intends to maintain its lead
in Japanese aerospace. The investment is especially
significant in light of the 1986 recession within the
16 "MHI to Expand Unechoic (sic) Chamber for FS-X,"
Aerospace Japan - Weekly, 18 July 1988, p. 8.
17 "Mitsubishi Completing Plant Modernization," Aviation
Week and Space Technology, 21 September 1987, p. 50.
18 "Industry Observer," Aviation Week and Space Technology,
2 February 1987, p. 13.
19 "MHI Prepares Technologies for FS-X," Wing Newsletter, 22
October 1986.
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Japanese economy. In 1982, the average yen-dollar exchange
rate was 249-1; in 1987, the average yen-dollar exchange
rate was 145-1, indicating a rise in yen strength of nearly
72% in just five years! Such a rise is devastating for an
export-driven economy. The other players in the big four
have had to deal with this problem as well (as described in
detail in a later section).
-·116-
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Kawasaki Heavy Industries
Japan does not export armaments.. .Hitherto the policy
has been largely academic...because few of its post-war
military products would have generated overseas demand.
Given a competitive pricing policy, however, the
Kawasaki XT-4 would probably be an exception....
-- Flight International, 2 January 1988
Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI) was originally
established in 1878 as a shipbuilding firm, a business
sector it continues today in addition to its operations in
aircraft and other heavy machinery. In 1986, KHI ranked
second to MHI in JDA contracts with programs valued at over
$1 billion, according to Aviation Week.2 0 Recent annual net
sales for KHI have been approximately Y700 billion ($4.15
billion @ Y168.5=$1), or one-fifth that of Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries. Aircraft sales account for roughly 17% of KHI's
total sales.2 1
Like MHI, KHI has benefitted from a steady progression
of technology acquisition starting from small parts
manufacture and developing, over the course of three
decades, to supersonic airframe design and manufacture.
KHI's contracts with the aerospace industries in the United
States and Western Europe have included:
20 Op. Cit., "MHI Leads Top..."
21 Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Annual Report 1985, p. 1.
^-I- 'I'ir r ·--- `-------··-·-------···i-·oli·l-rm
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o The US T-33A trainer and F-94C fighter programs
(1955), which gave KHI the opportunity to repair,
overhaul, and eventually manufacture relatively
unsophisticated airframes. The technical foundation
provided by the T-33A, in particular, was directly
applicable to KHI's independent production of its own
XT-4 trainer.
o The US Bell Model 47 (1955) and Boeing-Vertol 107
(1962) helicopter programs, which provided KHI first-
hand knowledge of helicopter manufacture well ahead of
its domestic competitors. The technology acquired
through these programs clearly formed the foundation
for KHI's later joint venture with MBB.
o The US P2V-7 (1959) and P-3C (1981) programs, which
included a specific technological assistance contract.
The P2V-7 was initially assembled from US components.
These programs provided in-depth knowledge of
relatively low-tech, subsonic airframe design.22
o The BK-117 helicopter (1981), jointly developed with
MBB of West Germany. This joint venture established
KHI as Japan's indigenous helicopter designer, a
specialty that may remain unchallenged by the other
22 Op. Cit., Arao p. 67.
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indigenous players. Further, this joint agreement
provides access to European technology and markets.
Following the Phase II characteristics also displayed
by MHI, KHI has aggressively applied the lessons learned
from foreign technology in indigenous designs. As Chart
Four indicates, these indigenous designs have included:
o P2J Antisubmarine patrol plane (1965), a relatively
unsophisticated airframe based heavily upon the
Lockheed Neptune. The P2J nonetheless showcased
KHI's manufacturing capabilities, based on its P2V-7
experience.
o The C-1 transport (1969), similar in design
sophistication to the P2J, the C-1 represented a
strong independent effort to develop a large, subsonic
airframe and avionics suite.
o The Asuka STOL (1980), a modest technological
advance countered by excessive delays and cost
overruns, this aircraft might have been useful as an
entrant into the commercial market. This 150-seat short
takeoff and landing (STOL) airliner cost more than
Y35.5 billion to modify from an existing C-1, according
to Flight International.2 3
23 "Asuka Stops Short," Flight International, 16 April 1988,
p. 3.
_1·111_1___1_________q____ -_11111__1_
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CHART FOUR
KHI JOINT DEVELOPMEN9T AND INDIGENOUS PROGRAMS
Level of Technological
Sophistication
Total Manufacture
and Development of
Advanced Design
Supersonic
High-G Airframe
Manufacture
Whole Subsonic
Airframe
Subassembly
Less "Key" Parts
Small Parts
Manufacture
and Repair
C-1
P2-J
Helicopters
P2-V
XT-4
ASUKA
IBell 47 BV 107
I F-94C
I T-33
I
1954 1964 1974 1984
Year
KEY: Cooperative programs with US = Bold
Independent, indigenous program = Standard
Source: Analysis of data contained in Jane's All the
World's Aircraft, years 1957 through 1989.
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o XT-4 jet trainer (1985), a world-class trainer by
many accounts that may prove pivotal in earning respect
of potential clients. The jet trainer is a logical
first step toward the development of a more advanced
supersonic fighter.
Though clearly second to MHI in technology, market
share, and spending, KHI has continued to invest in
development and production facilities including a new high
speed wind tunnel at Gifu, costing some Y3 billion,
according to Wing Newsletter.2 4 Further, KHI's president,
Kenko Hasegawa, highlighted aerospace as a key area for R&D
investment in a recent annual report. 2 5
24 "KHI to Build High Speed Wind Tunnel," Wing Newsletter,
10 September 1986.
25 Op. Cit., Kawasaki Annual Report, p. 3.
-- -"
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Fuji Heavy Industries
The Aircraft Division (at FHI) holds the greatest
possibility for development because of its high
technologies' and 'the two potentiaily large markets
of commercial aircraft production and the fledgling
Japanese space Industry.
-- 1987 FHI Annual Report
Fuji Heavy Industries (FHI) sprung from Japan's
Aircraft Research Laboratory, which was founded in 1917.
FHI is JDA's eighth largest supplier with 1986 contracts
valued at only $128 million.2 6 FHI's net sales for the year
totaled Y768 billion ($4.6 billion @ Y168.5=$1), just larger
than those of KHI. In 1987, 84% sales were produced by its
automobile division (Subaru), with aircraft contributing
less than 6%.27
Despite the small scale indicated by these statistics,
FHI has played a significant role in a number of joint
ventures with US firms including:
o Beechcraft Mentor (1953) and Cessna L-19 (1953)
License and technical assistance agreements with these
two US general aviation manufacturers allowed Fuji to
reassemble its aircraft manufacturing capability while
acquiring very unsophisticated, low-speed technology.
26 Op. Cit., "Mitsubishi Leads Top..."
27 Fuji Heavy Industries, Annual Report 1987, p. 1.
________11____
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o Bell 204B helicopter (1962), provided FHI its
first significant technological exposure to rotary-wing
flight. The 204B was originally sent to Fuji in kit
form.
o Fuji/700 business plane (1975) developed jointly
with the US firm Rockwell International. This
twin-prop is one level of sophistication over the
single-prop Beech and Cessna aircraft.
o 205A-1 helicopter, developed jointly with Bell in
the US, first flew in 1988.28 This helicopter presents
the only real domestic challenge to Kawasaki's
dominance.
Following the Phase II characteristics as indicated in
Chart Five, FHI has applied these technologies to indigenous
programs including:
o T-1 (1957) and T-3 (1978) jet trainers similar to
the early efforts of MHI and KHI, the trainer aircraft
represents a logical first step in the development of
integrated aircraft technology. Both of these programs
built upon the basic aluminum airframe technologies of
the Beech and Cessna aircraft.
28 "Uprated Fuji/Bell 205 Helicopter Made First Flight,"
Wing Newsletter, 11 May 1988.
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CHART FIVE
FBI JOINT DEVELOPMENT AND INDIGENOUS PROGRAMS
Level of Technological
Sophistication
Total Manufacture
and Development of
Advanced Design
Supersonic
High-G Airframe
Manufacture
Whole Subsonic
Airframe
Subassembly
Less "Key" Parts
Small Parts
Manufacture
and Repair
1964
Year
1974
KM2
T-1
IL-19
Mentor
1954
FA-200 700
T-3 205A
204B
KEY: Cooperative programs with US = Bold
KEY: Cooperative programs with US = Bold
Independent, indigenous program = Standard
Source: Analysis of data contained in Jane's All the
1984
World's Aircraft, years 1957 through 1989.
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o FA-200 light aircraft (1965), a clear outgrowth of
Fuji's work with Beech and Cessna, this low-speed,
general aviation aircraft contains rather simplistic
technology.
o KM-2 Kai trainer, which made its first flight in
1988, builds upon the T-3 experience.2 9
All of these programs served to keep FHI's hand in play
and enabled the firm to develop specific areas of
technological expertise, including the manufacture of
composite airframe parts. According to the Comline News
Service, FHI has developed a new technology for processing
composite materials, dramatically reducing processing
time.3 0 Comline has also reported that FHI plans to build a
new aircraft plant to support future aircraft production.3 1
29 "KM-2 KAI Made First Flight," Wing Newsletter, 11 May
1988.
30 "FHI Develops Ultrasonic Processing Technology for
Composite Material," Comline Transportation, 11 March 1988,
p. 6.
31 "FHI to Build New Aircraft Plant," Comline
Transportation, 22 January 1988, p. 8.
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Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries
Japanese aerospace companies are using their
participation in international high-technology
development programs to learn modern techniques of
sales, marketing and after-sales upport with a view
to being able to provide these components of total
aerospace programs in the future. A calse in point is
the Japan Aero Engines Corp.
-- Aviation Week, 21 September 1987
Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries started operations
in 1853. Today, IHI is Japan's leader in the production of
jet engines. It is also the leader of the Japan Aero Engine
Corporation (JAEC)--Japan's engine consortium comprised of
IHI, KHI, and MHI. IHI was fourth in the ranking of 1986
JDA contracts with agreements valued at $551 million,
according to Aviation Week.32 Net sales for 1986 were Y800
billion ($4.7 billion @Y168.6=$1), slightly more than those
of FHI. Aero engines contributed 12% to sales in 1986,
according to annual report data.33
IHI has gained virtually all of its jet engine
technology from joint ventures with the United States. It
manufactures, under US license, engines for essentially all
of Japan's fixed-wing military aircraft. Yet despite this
incredible product range and near monopoly, jet propulsion
technology remains Japan's greatest technological weakness
in aircraft production. This weakness can be traced back to
32 Op. Cit., "Mitsubishi Leads Top...".
33 Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries, Annual Report 1986,
p. 27.
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the seven-year lag after World War II during which jet
engine technology was initially refined in the West. To
this point, IHI has not made the investment in developmental
facilities or manpower necessary to overcome this weakness
on its own. Instead, IHI is relying on foreign assistance
from the worldwide technology leaders.
IHI apparently believes that the key to overcoming this
technology lag is the V2500 international jet engine program
with Pratt and Whitney of the United States, Rolls-Royce in
the United Kingdom, and others. JAEC, led by IHI, has a 23%
interest in the V2500, which powers the all-new European
Airbus A320 commercial airliner. IHI hopes to acquire
state-of-the-art technology from its Western partners while
developing indigenously the less sophisticated portions of
the engine.
The JAEC consortium is a critical component of this
strategy. According to Aviation Week, "JAEC coordinates the
activities of these three companies, controls the financing
for their share of the engine development work, including
government loans, and provides some of the engineering
staff."3 4 Such careful coordination eliminates duplication
of effort, maximizing efficiency.
34 "Japanese Study Partners' Sales, Support Techniques,"
Aviation Week and Space Technology, 21 September 1987, p.
49.
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According to industry experts35, IHI probably has the
capability to manufacture any jet engine currently in
production. Indeed, the manufacturing director at Pratt and
Whitney believes this to be the case. IHI's primary
stumbling block lies in development. Experts disagree on
whether or not the V2500 will lift IHI significantly in its
attempt to become a world-class player in jet propulsion.
35 Interview with a manufacturing manager at Pratt and
Whitney, in Boston on January 23, 1989.
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Analytical Comment
As the three technology charts (Charts Three, Four, and
Five) confirm, foreign technology acquisition is a key
component to Japan's Phase II strategic challenge to develop
an independent capability in aerospace. It is also
interesting to note the slope of MHI's development versus
that of KHI and FHI. MHI's level of technological
sophistication has continued to rise throughout Phase II,
while KHI and FHI have seemed to slow down. This trend
largely explains MHI's continued dominance of Japan's
aerospace industry.
It is also important to note that while each major
program is associated with the prime contractor, in nearly
every case substantial portions of the program were the
responsibility of subcontractors. Unlike the anti-trust
regulation in the United States, cartelization of the
Japanese aircraft industry was a matter of policy beginning
with the First Aircraft Industry Promotion Law of 1954. The
Japanese subcontractors have generally included the other
members of Japan's big four.
As Japan's aerospace industry--led by MHI but
complemented by the individual technological strengths of
collaborating firms--progressed through Phase II, the
ultimate goal of being a world-class player became more
----------~1~~1~- `^-'"`""`-
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clear. At the same time, key technological gaps--especially
propulsion, airframe and avionics design and development,
and systems integration--began to emerge. The big four also
began to perceive weaknesses in critical portions of their
aerospace value-added chain, including marketing and after-
sales service. Phase III, which I define as starting in
1988 with the formalization of the FS-X program, is
characterized by a direct attempt to fill these gaps; it
represents a fine-tuned version of Phase II, with the
ultimate goal more clearly in sight (see Chart Six). The
FS-X program represents, for Japanese industry, the key
element of its Phase III strategy, as the next chapter
describes.
__ __I_
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CHART SIX
DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGY IN THE JAPANESE AEROSPACE INDUSTRY
Phase I
1952-1959
Phase II
1959-1988
Phase III
1988-
"Logical Incrementalism"
Concentrate on repair/manufacturing end
of value-added chain
Attempt to coordinate players through
industry councils
Take-what-you-can-get
Strong technical dependence on US
Steady progression of foreign technology
acquisition
Apply learned technology to indigenous
product
Consortium forming
Begin to approach whole value-added chain
Increase specialization among major players
Strategy linked to specific programs such
as FS-X
Cooperate in global ventures as co-equals
Build foundation for independent industry
Approach world-class aerospace status
"Maintaining options"
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CHAPTER THREE: PROGRAMS, GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS
Chapter three describes in detail the critical programs
that comprise Japan's Phase III strategy, the influence of
government support' and regulation, and key macroeconomic
considerations that constrain Japan's aerospace expansion. A
modified Porter analysis is presented, along with the
author's projections for likely strategies and counter
strategies that may emerge as the global industry responds
to the Japanese challenge.
The FS-X Program
Pressure from U.S. Defense Secretary Casper W.
Weinberger has convinced Japanese Prime Minister
Yasuhiro Nakasone that production of a U.S. aircraft...
will be the price for normal trade relations between
the two countries.
-- Aviation Week, 18 May 1987
Just as the V2500 international engine program is a key
to Japan's engine development, the $7-8 billion FS-X fighter
program, with General Dynamics in the United States, is the
key to Japan's development of world-class military airframes
and avionics. The joint US-Japan FS-X program, which was
formally agreed to on November 29, 1988, was the subject of
intense controversy between the two countries and among
factions in the Japanese bureaucracy. The program also
marks Japan's entry into Phase III of its strategic
development.
The Japanese aerospace industry, supported by MITI and
the Air Staff Office in the JDA, had lobbied strongly for a
purely indigenous program to replace its obsolescent F-1
fighter force with an all-new fighter of the 1990s, FS-X.
----------- - L .... 
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The industry, led by MHI, argued that the T-2 CCV, MELCO's ; :-..--.
advanced radar program, and other industry successes proved
that they were capable of developing their own next-
generation fighter (albeit with a US engine). Bowing to
pressure from the US Administration and Congress, Japan
agreed that FS-X would be loosely based on the US F-16
design, with the United States responsible for some 35- to
45-percent of the total workshare; the remaining workshare
belonged to Japanese industry led by MHI.
The key to the FS-X agreement, however, was that for
the first time in history, the United States would provide
Japan with assistance in the design and development of a
state-of-the-art fighter--not simply licensed production of
a US-designed product. Instead of going through years of
expensive, independent development, Japanese industry will
be guided by US industry through the complex maze of design
and systems integration allowing the Japanese to overcome
almost all of the remaining technological obstacles to their
development of a world-class aerospace industry. Further,
Japan is only now capable of participating in such an
advanced program due to the strong technology base it has
acquired through decades of coproduction agreements with the
United States (as indicated in the company profiles in
chapter two).
"-"-- -- -----^I- l-C1- rr. * -xi;·iLlrr.rs*?r·-ura-;-··,?rir-rara
40
In short, FS-X is the key element of Japan's Phase III
strategy. The program will address all of Japan's most
critical technological gaps, except for propulsion.
Further, the program will allow Japan to gain experience
with a new foreign partner, General Dynamics. From General
Dynamics perspective, the FS-X program offers an opportunity
to gain access to Japanese "electronics" technologies. 3 6
There is considerable debate whether or not the FS-X
program will provide benefits to the United States or if it
simply represents another net technology loss from the US to
Japan. Abegglen and Stalk argue that the Japanese aerospace
threat is more imagined than real.3 7 US Senator Danforth
has led the fight in Congress against the FS-X agreement,
claiming it will damage US interests. Former US Commerce
Department official Clyde Prestowitz believes that "because
of this (FS-X) agreement, (the Japanese) will have taken a
giant step to becoming a world-class aircraft manufacturer,
and we will help them to do it." 38 The respected industry
36 It is not clear if General Dynamics (GD) has targeted
specific Japanese technologies. In conversations with a
manager at GD in the fall of 1988 in Boston, this issue
remain unresolved. This author is concerned that like US
partners that have preceded GD, the US firm may not be in a
position to select knowledgeably those Japanese technologies
that may offer it the highest benefit.
37 James Abegglen and George Stalk. Kaisha (New York: Basic
Books, 1985), p. 64.
38 Steven Dryden and Neil Gross, "Are We Giving Japan
Blueprints for a World-Class Aircraft Industry?," Business
Week, 20 June 1988, p. 62. See also Clyde Prestowitz.
Trading Places, (New York: Basic Books, 1988).
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journal, Aviation Week and Space Technology, recently
published an editorial titled "U.S. Technological Lead at
Risk" that stated their concern that the FS-X agreement
"will be used to bolster Japan's already impressive
manufacturing base."3 9 Samuels and Whipple point out that
the FS-X program demonstrates that the real challenge to
American interests may lie in lost share of military or
"dual-use" markets, not strictly commercial markets.4 0
I believe that the FS-X program does present a serious
challenge to US interests that, if properly managed, may
also present opportunities. The key to exploiting these
opportunities lies in genuine technology exchange. The
United States can no longer afford to sell technology to
potential competitors since it is no longer the world
technology leader in many areas.
Clearly, the Japanese have aerospace product and
process technologies from which US firms may benefit.
Japanese product technologies which may be of particular
interest to US firms may include MELCO's next-generation
attack radar (which builds upon Japan's indigenous strengths
in microelectronics) and Mitsubishi's co-bonded composite
39 "U.S. Technological Lead at Risk," Aviation Week and
Space Technology, 1 August 1988, p. 7.
40 Richard Samuels and Benjamin Whipple, "Defense Production
and Industrial Development: The Case of Japanese Aircraft,"
(Cambridge: MIT-Japan Science and Technology Program, 1988).
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wing technology. Process technologies such as FHI's
composites techniques may also be of interest. Other
technologies not directly related to current aerospace
applications--such as artificial intelligence--could also
add a level of flexibility to technology exchange
agreements.
The challenge to US firms lies in their ability to
select knowledgeably and negotiate aggressively for those
Japanese technologies that offer the highest benefit. US
firms that passively rely on Japanese offerings of
technology in exchange for US technology will likely be
disappointed. After all, the Japanese in general are
extremely competent negotiators, supported by MITI, which
claims many of Japan's top university graduates each year.
_____
43
The Role of Government Support:
Ministry of International Trade and Industry and the
Japanese Defense Agency
... Nobuyoshi Namiki, a former MITI official and one
of its best-known theorists, defends research cartels
in the targeted industries as Japan's only way to
compete with the United States' much larger and
richer research and development establishment.
-- Chalmers Johnson in
California Management Review, Summer 1985
According to Chalmers Johnson, MITI has the primary
responsibility in the Japanese government to formulate and
execute national industrial policy. The United States has
no comparable equivalent. MITI's four primary tasks,
according to Johnson, are:
o Formulate medium-term econometric forecasts.
o Arrange for the preferential allocation of capital
for selected industries.
o Target those industries it believes Japan must
develop in the future and create a package of
policy measures to promote such development.
o Develop industrial policies for structurally
recessed industries, like shipbuilding. 41
41 Chalmers Johnson, "The Institutional Foundations of
Japanese Industrial Policy," California Management Review,
Summer 1985, pp. 66-67.
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While MITI's contribution to the development of Japan's
aerospace industry is significant, I believe that Johnson's
argument and widely-held public perceptions of MITI's role
are probably overstated. Clearly, the "invisible hand" of
market forces is swayed somewhat by MITI's influence with
the consent of the major industrial players to provide for
the mutual accommodation of governmental and industrial
interests--a process described as "reciprocal consent" by
Samuels.4 2 In a similar fashion, Friedman explains the
influence of MITI as resting somewhere between the all
powerful "bureaucratic regulation thesis" and the laissez-
faire "market regulation thesis." 4 3
Regardless of its ability to control aerospace
strategic development, MITI has long published a "wish list"
that included high aspirations for the aerospace industry.
In 1988, along with technologies like artificial
intelligence and biotechnology, MITI listed development of
hypersonic planes as a priority. According to the Wall
Street Journal, MITI is expected to request initial funding
of Y40 billion ($313 million @Y128=$1) for an eight-year
42 Richard J. Samuels. The Business of the Japanese State,
(Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 8, 288-
289.
43 David Friedman. The Misunderstood Miracle (Ithica, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 3, 33, 58, 205.
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project to develop the engines and airframe for an "Orient
Express" .44
According to the Wing Newsletter, MITI has provided
direct subsidies of 50- to 75-percent to Japan's aerospace
industry to develop commercial aircraft. 4 5 MITI's enabling
law recently changed so that now manufacturers get loans
through MITI and the Japan Development Bank, rather than
through direct subsidy. An amendment to the law also changed
MITI's objective from promoting the "aircraft industry
through the advancement of domestic aircraft production" to
promoting the "aircraft industry through the advancement of
international joint development".46
I believe that this MITI pronouncement is a recognition
of a strategic shift by Japan's aerospace firms that was
formalized by the FS-X program. This shift demonstrates a
key element of Phase III: namely, that Japan's
technological independence in aerospace can only come
through international joint ventures in which Japan plays
the role of a co-equal partner. Accordingly, MITI shifted
its funding to the aerospace industry from indigenous R&D to
44 Stephen K. Yoder, "All Eyes are on MITI Research Wish
List," Wall Street Journal, 24 August 1988, p. 10.
45 "MITI Changes Subsidizing Mode," Wing Newsletter, 19
February 1986.
46 Ibid.
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support for international joint ventures--an unprecedented
change.
The regulatory environment in Japan also promotes the
development of the aerospace industry in a fashion
contradictory to US anti-trust law. Consortia, such as the
Japan Aero Engine Corporation and the FS-X group (MHI, KHI,
FHI, IHI, and MELCO), allow the industry to speak with a
stronger voice when dealing with the Japanese government or
foreign partners. Consortia also permit development and
production efficiencies essential to an industry plagued by
small scale and limited indigenous demand. Further, by
presenting a unified voice with government support, the
industry is also able to take advantage of "related demand":
for example, Boeing's consideration of a joint venture with
MHI may well be strongly influenced by the fact that Japan
Airlines (JAL) is its single largest 747 customer--a fact
that MITI is likely to remind Boeing of during the course of
negotiations.
In the development of military aircraft, the Japanese
Defense Agency has played a role similar to that played by
the Department of Defense in the United States. However,
JDA has been willing to pay a significant surcharge (usually
between 40% and 150%, depending on the system) to allow
Japanese industry to produce US systems under license in
order to gain an understanding of the technology. Critics
have long argued, for instance, that Japan pays at least 40%
_I____
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more to manufacture the F-15 in Japan than it would cost to
buy a complete F-15 directly from the United States. Others
argue that the technology gained from indigenous manufacture
more than compensates for this surcharge.
Another key difference in the procurement of military
aircraft is that in Japan, the military market is
responsible for some 80% of aerospace production. (This
percentage probably does not include the significant funds
spent on space launch vehicles, which are considered to be
for "commercial use only.") According to SJAC, JDA's demand
has comprised some 80% of the market for nearly two
decades.4 7 Domestic commercial demand and export demand
have each traditionally amounted to less than 10%.
With demand so clearly dominated by military programs,
the capital infrastructure within Japan's aerospace industry
logically reflects this bias. Production facilities are
geared toward the manufacture of small (by airliner
standards) aircraft and small (by F-16 production standards)
production runs. This raises a serious barrier to entry for
an industry with aspirations of entering world commercial
aircraft markets. (The implications for the possible
removal of this barrier are discussed in a later section.)
47 Op. Cit., Arao, p. 35.
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The Commercial Aircraft Market: The 7J7 Program
The 7J7/YXX partnership is the logical progression
for our friends who have been program participants in
the Boeing 767 production. We are delighted that they
have agreed to join us in the development, production,
and marketing of an exciting new concept in commercial
aviation.
-- Boeing President Shrontz in Wing, 12 March 86
Japan's "qualifying entry" into the world commercial
market was to have been the 7J7 (originally YXX) program
with Boeing in the United States. The Japan Aircraft
Development Corporation (JADC) was Japan's 7J7 industry
consortium--led by MHI--established to handle the industry's
25% equity share in the program. Japan sent some 250
engineers to Boeing's main facility in Seattle to begin
development work on the 150-seat 7J7 airliner, according to
Wing Newsletter.48
In 1987, Boeing delayed indefinitely the development of
the 7J7 program citing its concerns over the aircraft size,
engine, price, production rates, and market uncertainty,
according to Aviation Week.4 9 JADC was left empty-handed
with no sizeable commercial program in sight. From a
strategic viewpoint, the postponement meant that a critical
goal of Phase III--namely, filling the gaps in the value-
48 "250 Japanese Engineers in Seattle to Help 7J7 Design,"
Wing Newsletter, 7 May 1986.
49 "Boeing Delays 7J7 Program; Mid-1993 Certification
Expected," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 31 August
1987, p. 28.
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added chain such as marketing and after-market support--
would remain unfulfilled (see Chart Seven).
According to Boeing officials, 5 0 the primary benefits
they seek in a joint venture with the Japanese include risk
sharing, market access, financing, and additional
manufacturing capacity. Japanese quality and performance
during ventures with Boeing have been excellent; in fact,
Boeing usually does not double source Japanese components--a
quality-assurance practice it follows on joint ventures with
many other partners.
It is interesting to note that Boeing has taken little
advantage of the vast process technology of its Japanese
partners, particularly in light of Boeing's recent
production difficulties. I believe that Boeing, like most
(and possibly all) major US aerospace firms, has not
established the internal linkages between its manufacturing,
engineering, and international business departments that
could make such beneficial technology absorption possible.
From the Japanese perspective, the 7J7 postponement put
new emphasis on the FS-X program and the need to keep
Japanese industry working on a next-generation aircraft
design, albeit a military one. Combined with the
50 Interview with senior managers at Boeing Commercial
Airplanes, held in Seattle on January 18, 1989.
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concomitant crash of a JAL 747 for which Boeing accepted
responsibility, JADC members were forced to reconsider their
relationship with Boeing. The Japanese also undoubtedly
reexamined their commercial aircraft strategy, and must have
seen the formidable barriers before them.
 ------ II L· - -i -·- -i -· ·- · -
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CHART SEVEN
AEROSPACE VALUE-ADDED CHAIN
SYSTEM R&D
AIRFRAME -- AVIONICS -- PROPULSION
R&D > COMPONENT FABRICATION > TEST > SUBSYSTEM
ASSEMBLY > TEST > SYSTEM ASSEMBLY > TEST
SYSTEM ASSEMBLY AND INTEGRATION
INTEGRATED SYSTEM TESTING
MARKETING, SALES, AND DISTRIBUTION
I
OPERATIONS, MAINTENANCE, AND TESTING
I
AFTER-SALES SERVICE
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Barriers to Entry in the Commercial Market
Firms cannot abandon the international market, (US
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Commerce) Brubaker said.
Return on sales is faster than in domestic programs,
allowing more ra pid re-'nvestment in new technology
research and development, he said.
-- Aviation Week, 1 September 1986
The scale needed to compete as a prime contractor in
the worldwide commercial aircraft market is enormous. As a
result, there are only a few players: Boeing and McDonnell
Douglas in the United States and Airbus Industries, a West
European consortium. The US players developed over the past
few decades aided by research conducted by NASA and the
military. Airbus, the most recent member to this elite
club, has been sustained by massive government subsidies. A
number of industry journals indicate that development costs
for a new commercial airliner and engine total nearly $4
billion.
My analysis, which is based on Porter's five forces,51
leads me to believe that if Japan chose to enter the
commercial market as a prime contractor, it would face
severe hurdles including:
o Lack of indigenous market -- Japan's airlines alone
would not provide sufficient demand to justify
commercial aircraft development, except on a very
51 Michael Porter's five forces are suppliers, competitors,
customers, potential entrants, and substitutes. These are
described in detail in his book, Competitive Strategy:
Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors (New
York: Free Press, 1980).
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limited scale. Both the United States and Western
Europe have sufficient indigenous market sizes to
justify independent development. It is interesting
to note here that the major aircraft producers do not
know the precise break-even point in aircraft
production, although numbers like 500-600 are often
given.
o Need to invest tens of billions of dollars in
infrastructure -- Japan does not currently possess the
physical plant necessary for commercial development,
although it certainly has the financial capability
to acquire these resources in the future if it so
chooses. There exists a large body of literature that
suggests that the cost of capital is lower for Japanese
firms than for Western firms largely because Japanese
industrial groups (keiretsu)--such as the Mitsubishi
group--are generally centered around banks which have a
stake in their success and an intimate knowledge of
their operations.5 2
o Severe competitor reaction -- The major aerospace
firms in the United States and Europe would be in a
strong position to isolate Japan from technology and
52 There are many sources referring to a lower cost of
capital for Japanese firms, but the most concise may well be
Kaisha by Abegglen and Stalk (New York: Basic Books, 1985),
pp. 15, 152, 161, 178.
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market access. While Boeing may not have been prepared
for the Airbus challenge, both Boeing and Airbus appear
to be prepared for a possible Japanese challenge. In
short, the window of opportunity may be closed.
O Undeveloped marketing and service network -- Japan
has virtually no experience in commercial aircraft
marketing and sales, critical keys to success. In
light of the 7J7 postponement, there appears to be
no other program in the near future that could assist
in filling this value-added chain gap. Some argue that
the same situation held when Sony first entered the
television business. However, given safety
considerations and the high initial and opportunity
costs of an airliner, it is unlikely that airlines
would be as tolerant of lapses in product marketing and
service as television buyers.
o Unproven track record -- Lack of proven reliability
could lead to certification difficulties and customer
mistrust. Again, the consumer good analogy is not
applicable given safety considerations and costs
involved.
o Insufficient research (and probably manpower) base -
Japan has never had to "go-it-alone" in commercial
aircraft development, leading some to charge that its
------·---- - - -"--·--------
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core research and manpower base is insufficient. Japan
does graduate more engineers than does the United
States, but it graduates only about one-ninth the
number of scientists and mathematicians.5 3 Further,
few of Japan's engineering degrees are in aerospace
relative to electrical, automotive, and mechanical
engineering degrees. Finally, with the number of
employees in the aerospace industry remaining
relatively flat, the market for aerospace engineering
has been limited.
o Overdependence on US Technology -- Japanese
aerospace firms may be trapped by their past reliance
on US manufacturers. A similar phenomenon was observed
in the Japanese automotive industry by Cusumano: "In
retrospect, it appears that Nissan's reliance on
direct technology transfer from the United States
caused managers to become more dependent on foreign
techniques and less innovative in process
development..." 5 4
o Technological lag in propulsion -- Japanese
industry and MITI have long recognized this major
technological weakness, and have taken few
53 Clyde Prestowitz. Trading Places (New York: Basic Books,
1988), p. 126.
54 Michael A. Cusumano. The Japanese Automobile Industry
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 373.
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effective measures to correct this lag. Experts
disagree over IHI's ability to close this gap through
the V2500 engine program. It is important to note
that designing an aircraft to accommodate an
off-the-shelf engine adds little or no additional
technical complexity to an aircraft program. Indeed,
many aircraft are designed to accommodate a number
of engines made by different manufacturers. However,
one may ask if it is possible to possess a world-class
aerospace industry without the capability to design
a jet engine independently.
This analysis has presented obstacles that, by
themselves, may be overcome. However, given all these
obstacles and current market conditions including the
positions of major competitors, I believe that it is highly
unlikely the Japan will attempt to enter the commercial
market as a prime contractor in the foreseeable future.
However, these conditions do not preclude Japan's growth as
a major subcontractor. Indeed, based on this analysis and
including the historical factors described in detail in
chapter two, Japan's strategy appears to be:
o Concentrate on international joint ventures in order
to gain technology and marketing expertise.
_I__
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o Acquire the ability to form joint partnerships on
a more even-equity basis, gaining more control over the
program and earning the reputation as a world-class
commercial player.
o Build a foundation upon which an independent
commercial aircraft industry could be based if market
forces in the future allowed.
These three elements form the core of Japan's aerospace
strategy for the period I have defined as Phase III.
It is important to note that the Japanese may well be
considering longer term economic rents than those clearly
indicated in a simple analysis based on aerospace industry
profitability alone. One such economic rent, as defined by
von Hippel, includes the importance of aerospace as an
innovating "lead user" in a number of markets critical to
the Japanese economy--including machine tools, advanced
materials, electronic displays, and minicomputers.5 5 In
fact, the very first numerically controlled (NC) machine
tool produced in Japan was financed by MHI's Nagoya Aircraft
Factory.5 6 Such "spin-off" or "spun-on" technology is
difficult to quantify, but it is clearly important,
especially from the longer-term Japanese perspective.
55 Eric von Hippel. The Sources of Innovation (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 102-115.
56 Ezra Vogel. Comeback (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1985), p. 81.
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Japan and the Military Aircraft Market
Japan's industrial giants, which dominate the world's
consumer electronics, semiconductor and automotive
markets, are quietly preparing to enter the one arena
in which the United States is still dominant -- the
$500 billion-a-year global arms bazaar.
-- Boston unda'y obe, 30 October 1988
The Japanese self-imposed restriction on the export of
armaments confronts directly their rising capabilities and
aspirations to compete in global aircraft markets, even at
the component level. The small indigenous market for
military aircraft, comprised solely of the demand generated
by the Japanese Defense Agency, is not sufficient to support
independently a military aircraft industry. Yet, that
industry continues to produce aircraft (albeit at a
significant premium), invest significant funds in
development and manufacturing infrastructure, and incite
unwavering support within much of the Japanese bureaucracy,
especially MITI. Exports, it would seem, might well be the
key to profitability through the extension of production
runs to achieve reasonable economies of scale.
From a cultural standpoint, the Japanese people as a
whole are probably not ready to accept the export of
military hardware. Indeed, the recent public debate over
defense expenditures rising above 1% of GNP reflects the
taboo associated with anything military. However, some
firms have already attempted to circumvent the social taboo
and legal restrictions. In 1981, for instance, a Japanese
.------l---""r(mP-%---
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firm attempted to export guns to Korea by describing the
merchandise as "steel tubes".5 7
As the big four in aerospace come to realize that the
export restriction is stifling their growth--and perhaps the
attainment of international prestige--export of military
components may well become a carefully-studied option.
Clearly, the existing capital infrastructure is geared
toward the production of military aircraft. A likely
Japanese strategy, taking advantage of this infrastructure,
appears to be:
o Use the FS-X to gain world-class credentials in
military aircraft.
o Become more aggressive in the export of so-called
dual-use components, especially those components
associated with high-performance aircraft.
Both of these points represent logical extensions of
the strategy observed during Phase II. They do not, by
themselves, violate legal provisions or corporate
objectives. Given success in these two areas, Japan's
aerospace industry might well consider exporting a purely
military component as a test case, paying careful attention
to the existing trade climate. As an extreme, the aerospace
57 JF Daguzan, "Japanese Penetration in ASEAN," Defense and
Armament Heracles International, June 1988, p. 27.
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industry (or specific firms within the industry) might then
be prepared to enter the military market if the export
restriction were lifted, even if only in a de facto sense.
The military market does not represent an easy market
for the Japanese to enter. Indeed, the low end of the
market--the likely entry point for a new manufacturer--is
crowded with producers who dominate North America, Europe,
and the Middle East. Nevertheless, the,military market is
clearly more receptive than the commercial market, where
buyers attach particular significance to product history--a
characteristic that a Japanese aircraft would clearly lack.
_I_ 11 
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Countering Macroeconomic Problems
In addition to confronting social taboos and legal
restrictions, the big four have to address significant
macroeconomic problems created by the rising value of the
yen, the fluctuating domestic economy, and trade frictions--
especially those with the United States. In a general
sense, the individual firms have followed similar strategies
in attacking these issues.
To counter the rising yen and the domestic recession,
the firms have tried to cut costs by slowing planned capital
investments, allowing employee rolls to decrease through
retirement and other forms of "natural attrition," and
transferring employees to more profitable sectors within the
firm. It is important to note that the aerospace sectors of
these firms tend to be very profitable--it is their sectors
such as shipbuilding that have suffered the most from the
recession. Further, with exports accounting for such a
small portion of aerospace output, the rising yen has not
had a significant impact on profitability in these areas.
Trade frictions represent a key concern. Indeed, if
not for the pressure imposed by the United States
government, the FS-X fighter program would have been a
purely indigenous effort. The Japanese recognize--as does
the US Congress--that aerospace is one of the few sectors
where the US consistently runs a trade surplus vis-a-vis
Japan. While the Japanese are pleased to accept US
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technology, they are somewhat less willing to accept US
guidance on the operation of their industry.
As long as major aircraft sales are decided by high-
ranking government officials, Japanese industry is somewhat
limited in its exercise of any counter strategy. Despite
this limitation, the key to the counter strategy must lie in
Japan's ability to convince its Western partners that a
realignment has taken place. As Samuels and Whipple
describe it,
The shift towards aerospace industrial development
via increased defense production is best seen as part
of a larger, nascent Japanese industrial policy and
national security strategy stimulated in large part
by declining American hegemony and the realignment of
power in the international political economy.
... the FS-X agreement (for example) is simply a
reflection of the shifting terms of trade in advanced
technology.
58 Richard Samuels and Benjamin Whipple, "Defense Production
and Industrial Development: The Case of Japanese Aircraft,"
(Cambridge: MIT-Japan Science and Technology Program, 1988),
p. 6.
59 Ibid., p. 22.
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Conclusion:' A Rising Challenge to US Industry
The rising capabilities and aspirations of the Japanese
aerospace industry pose an unprecedented challenge to the US
aerospace industry. US firms must decide if they should
cooperate with Japan, possibly creating a future competitor,
or ignore Japan and lose any hope of control over the
emergence of an aerospace power. The choice is by no means
clear.
The FS-X will be a key indicator of success in Japan's
emergence. If the program falters seriously, the Japanese
will likely not be prepared to compete as a prime contractor
in the next generation of aircraft. If FS-X is a resounding
success, the Japanese are likely to be emboldened, awaiting
the slightest misstep (such as a major program failure or a
withdrawal from the market altogether) of an existing world-
class competitor to provide its entry point. I believe that
such a misstep would be a necessary (but not sufficient)
condition to provide Japan a minimum level of confidence to
enter the worldwide aircraft oligopoly.
While the increased export of high-value-added avionics
components represents the most likely Japanese approach to
world markets, it will also be interesting to watch for a
"commercialized" version of aircraft like the successful
XT-4. In addition, any explicit or de facto change in the
existing export restrictions would signal a major change in
...~_ _1__1~ 1_1___ _~_ _ID~_ _ _sU~_
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strategy. The big four will continue to wait, absorbing all
the foreign technology they can acquire and building upon
their indigenous strengths in electronics, advanced
materials and optics. "Maintaining options" is clearly a
key element of Phase III.
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APPENDIX A
Response of US Industry: Boeing as a Case Study
From Boeing's perspective, joint ventures with the
Japanese offer both opportunities and challenges. My
analysis, based on interviews with senior Boeing executives
and others within the aerospace industry, leads me to
conclude that the opportunities include:
o Risk sharing -- The 7J7 program, in which the
Japanese held a 25-percent equity stake, is a clear
example of risk sharing in an all new, multi-billion
dollar project.
o Market Access -- Similarly, the 7J7 program was a
recognition that Boeing highly values its sales to the
Japanese airlines. Indeed, those airlines (Japan
Airlines and All Nippon Airlines) comprise Boeing's
single largest customer for its 747 model--Boeing's
"cash cow." By involving Japanese manufacturers,
Boeing helps to ensure continued access to this
lucrative market.
o Financing -- The Japanese are clearly in excellent
position to provide low-cost financing in the multi-
billion dollar scale demanded by the aerospace
industry.
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o Control -- By working with the Japanese, Boeing could
be in a position to direct some of Japan's
developmental efforts. Further, Boeing's association
with them allows for a continual information flow,
allowing the firm to observe the Japanese emergence.
o Block Airbus -- The Japanese link could serve to
block Boeing's primary rival, Airbus, from attempting
to establish a similar linkage. It is important to
note that Boeing no longer possesses a monopoly over
aerospace process and product technologies. As a
result, Boeing can no longer exert complete control
over Japan's foreign technology acquisition.
o Technology Access -- Boeing recognizes that the
Japanese have specific product and process technologies
that could provide the firm with a strategic advantage
with respect to its American and European competitors.
o Increased Service Network -- By having a manufacturer
based in the Far East, Boeing's spare parts response
time to key customers could be reduced.
-- 
These opportunities are countered by challenges including:
o Create Potential Competitor -- The analysis in
chapter two clearly indicates that technology transfer
from the United States has been the key element in
allowing Japanese aerospace to rise to its current
level of sophistication. By continuing this
relationship, particularly in allowing the Japanese to
cooperate on current, state-of-the-art programs, the
likelihood increases that Japan will become a serious
competitor in global aerospace markets.
o Limited Technology Access -- Some US managers are
concerned that Japanese aerospace firms will not
transfer their latest technology to the US. Indeed, as
the FS-X negotiations illustrated, it is much more
difficult to arrange technology barters than it is to
simply sell technology. The Japanese cite the US
refusal to transfer certain "black box" technology as a
justification for limiting access to their advanced
technology.
o Limited Usefulness of Foreign Technology -- The US
bias toward "not-invented-here" perceptions limits the
usefulness of foreign technologies acquired through
joint ventures. At the same time, Japanese receptivity
- J·-sl-------;;I-L.F- .-j_l-;
---i-ll---------·---------··-·I
68
to adopting and adapting foreign technology makes any
technology they acquire infinitely more valuable.
My attempt to produce a linear model incorporating the
opportunities and challenges described above was precluded
by a lack of consensus among US aerospace industry
executives with respect to the weights that each one of
these factors should be given. This lack of consensus--even
within a single firm--confirms my belief that a concerted
response to the Japanese challenge is not likely to evolve
in the near future.
_
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INTERVIEWS:
BOEING: Conversation with Mr. Tak Seto, Senior Manager of
International Business at Boeing Commercial Airplanes, held
in Seattle on January 18, 1989. Also present during this
interview was Mr. Roy Phillips, Director of International
and Joint Program Developments at Boeing and others.
GENERAL DYNAMICS: Conversations with Ms. Maryjo Morris, a
manager at General Dynamics, currently a Sloan Fellow, in
Cambridge, fall 1988.
McKINSEY: Conversation with Mr. Kenichi Ohmae, Tokyo Office
Manager for McKinsey (an international consulting firm), in
Tokyo, February 23, 1989.
PRATT AND WHITNEY: Conversation with Carl Thomas, Director
of Manufacturing at Pratt and Whitney and others, in Boston
on January 23, 1989.
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